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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1260 
 ___________ 
 
 STEPHEN P. FLEMING, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
CAPE MAY COUNTY, FAMILY PART, (D.Y.F.S.); MS. FLORINE ALEXANDER, 
CMCH; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY; COUNTIES OF ATLANTIC CITY 
AND CAPE MAY; JUDGE CAROL E. HIGBEE, Atlantic City Courthouse; JUDGE 
DARYL TODD, Cape May Courthouse; CAPT. LIN FRANE, D.A.’s Office, CMCH; 
DONALD A. WILKINGSON, ESQ. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-03894) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant  
 to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
     March 22, 2012 
 
 Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed:  April 5, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stephen Fleming, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals District Court 
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orders dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, exercising plenary review over the dismissal of the 
complaint.  See Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Connors v. 
Tremont Mining Co., 835 F.2d 1028, 1029 (3d Cir. 1987).  The denial of a motion for 
reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Ross v. Meagan
Having examined the record, we are in full accord with the District Court and, 
finding no substantial question presented by this appeal, will summarily affirm its 
judgment.  
, 638 F.2d 646, 648 
(3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Fleming’s complaint, which is confusing and disjointed, does not 
specify the nature of the relief he seeks, and is flawed in several respects.  To the extent 
that he directly attacks a state-court judgment, his claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman1 doctrine.  See Lampe v. Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 518 n.15 (3d Cir. 2011).  Many 
of the named defendants are probably entitled to varying forms of immunity.  See, e.g., 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (delineating the contours of prosecutorial 
immunity); Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(explaining judicial immunity); Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess
                                                 
1 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker  v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923). 
, 297 F.3d 
310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of 
“state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in 
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interest”).2  The complaint, even read with the degree of liberality afforded to pro-se 
pleadings, see Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), does not 
appear to state a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Federal criminal statutes do not, by their mere presence, 
grant a private right of action for use in civil suits.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 
273, 283–84 (2002).  Nor does the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A, create such a right of action.  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 
(1988).  To the extent that Fleming’s complaint can be read to imply a suit in diversity 
against defendant Donald Wilkinson, it still fails to “state a plausible claim for relief” due 
to its conclusory approach and lack of well-pleaded facts.  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Ordinarily, a District Court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting 
leave to amend.  
, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 
(2009)).  In sum, these many defects suggest that the District Court correctly dismissed 
the complaint pursuant to its 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) screening responsibilities. 
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110–111 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Here, however, amendment would be futile; the defects discussed above could not 
be corrected by amending the complaint.  Also, while it appears that Fleming may have 
intended to file a motion for appointment of counsel, see
                                                 
2 While “immunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense which must 
be affirmatively pleaded,” Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 
1986),  it may be raised sua sponte when apparent from the face of the complaint.  Ray v. 
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Letter, ECF No. 2, his 
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complaint lacked merit and, as such, a motion for appointment of counsel would have 
been properly denied.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2004).  Finally, 
we detect no abuse of discretion in the denial of Fleming’s motion for reconsideration, as 
he pointed to no “manifest errors of law or fact” in the District Court’s original order and 
did not otherwise “present newly discovered evidence.”  Blystone v. Horn
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
, 664 F.3d 397, 
415–16 (3d Cir. 2011). 
